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Part 2
Section XXI: — The Withdrawal from Kelantan.
161. On the 12th December 1941 the Commander, 3 Indian Corpr visited Command Headquarters to discuss the policy as regards the Kelantan Force.
It will be recalled that the task of the Kelantan Force had been the protection of the three aerodromes in that State for the use of our Air Force and the denial of them to the enemy In view of the situation some fresh instructions were clearly necessary. The alternatives were either to leave the force in Kelantan or to withdraw it for employment elsewhere. The factors. in favour of the former course were: —
(a) It might still be possible to prevent the enemy making full use of the three aerodromes.
(b) The presence of our force in Kelantan would contain a proportion of the enemy's force in that State.
(c) The moral effect of the withdrawal both on the civil population and on our own troops would not be good.
(d) We should probably lose some material and equipment in the withdrawal.
In favour of a withdrawal were the following factors: —
(a) The aerodromes were no longer required by our Air Force and there seemed to be no probability of them being required within a reasonable period of time.
(b) It seemed probable that the main threat would develop on the west coast, where we had inadequate resources with which to meet it.
(c) The communications of the Kelantan Force, which now consisted of only a single line railway with a number of bridges, were precarious, especially having in view the enemy's great air superiority.
(d) In view of (c) above and of the superiority on land which the enemy was likely to develop, it seemed probable that we should lose the force if it remained in Kelantan.
After full consideration I decided, with a view to conserving our resources and concentrating them for the main battle which would probably develop on the west coast, to with draw the Kelantan Force as soon as rolling stock could be made available. This decision was submitted to the C.-in-C., Far East, the same afternoon and approved by him. Orders were issued immediately and the evacuation of surplus stores started at once.
162. On the 12th December the enemy became very active and attacked in strength, but the 2/10 Baluch Regt. counter-attacked, coming to close grips with the enemy and inflicting casualties.
On the 13th December the 2/10 Baluch Regt. again inflicted casualties on the enemy who were trying to advance round their flank.
163. During the next few days the withdrawal continued systematically, the enemy being made to fight for each position, with comparatively little toss to the defenders. By the 16th December all surplus stores and equipment had been evacuated and the withdrawal of the troops by rail began. The 4/19 Hyderabads were the first to leave so that they could rejoin their own brigade on the west coast. On the 19th December the railhead at Kuala Krai was evacuated. The rearmost troops with drew from Kuala Krai on foot as the large railway bridges a little south of that place had by then been destroyed. Practically all the stores and all the vehicles, except about 80 for which no railway flats were available, were successfully evacuated. A rearguard under Lt.-Col. McKellar, known as Macforce, was left behind to watch the railway and prevent the repair of the bridges. It included troops of the Pahang Volunteers and the Malay Regiment, and carried out its duties most efficiently
On completion of the withdrawal on the 22nd December the 8 Indian Infantry Brigade concentrated in the Kuala Lipis/Jerantut area except for the 2/12 Frontier Force Regt. which rejoined its brigade at Kuantan.
164. The casualties suffered in the Kelantan fighting had been fairly heavy but not excessive. The conduct of the operations generally and especially of the withdrawal reflected great credit on the Commander of the Force (Brigadier B. W. Key) and his staff.
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