Malaya Command

Operations on the Mainland of Malaya

Part 2

Section XX: — The Air Situation 11th December, 1941.

157.  Photographs taken of the aerodromes in South Thailand showed that the Japanese were already  operating  large  numbers  of aircraft from them. On Singora aerodrome alone there were upwards of 100 aircraft with comparatively little anti-aircraft gun protection a wonderful target had we had an adequate and balanced Air Striking Force. The enemy were of course also operating their longer range types of aircraft from their bases in Indo-China and possibly also from aircraft carriers. It is probable that they were operating some 300 modern aircraft at   this  time. Their  bombers   were   of   the Navy 96,  the Army 97 and  the Junkers 88 types, all twin-engined machines.  Their dive bomber was the Junkers 87B.   Their torpedo bombers were Navy 97's and their fighters were Navy "O" (or Zero) machines. A wide use of auxiliary petrol tanks for the fighters gave them increased range.

In face of this attack the losses suffered by our small Air Force in North Malaya had been comparatively heavy. They had been heavier than they otherwise would have been owing to the inability, due to lark of resources, to provide adequate fighters in North Malaya for the defence of aerodromes and the protection of the bombers, and also owing to the lack of ground defence against low-frying aircraft.

158.  On the 9th and 10th December, Dutch air reinforcements arrived in Malaya from the Netherlands East  Indies. They consisted of three squadrons of Glenn Martin Bombers totalling   22   aircraft  and  one   squadron   of   nine Buffalo   fighters. Unfortunately the Dutch bomber pilots wore not fully trained in night flying or in advanced navigation over the sea, so that it was necessary for them to return, a squadron at a time, to the Netherlands East Indies for further training in these subjects. Nevertheless, the Netherlands East Indies had shown a most co-operative spirit  in sending these   aircraft, as well as submarines, so promptly to our assistance.

159.  On the morning of the 11th December. 1941, rather more than 100 aircraft were avail able for operations disposed as under: —

Selelar.

Vickers   Vildebeeste   Torpedo Bombers             18

Catalina Flying Boats                                               1

Sharks                                                                      5

Swordfish                                                                4

Sembawang.

Hudson   General   Reconnaissance                          4

Buffalo Fighters                                                       17

Glenn Martin Bombers (N.E.I.)                               13

Tengah.

Blenheim IV Bombers                                               8

Kallang. Buffalo Fighters                                        26

Taiping.

The surviving aircraft from the Northern aerodromes reinforced by a few from the South.

160. On the 11th December it was decided that the air policy should be as follows: —

(a) Bombing, except in special circumstances, to be confined to night. This was made necessary by the enemy's fighter superiority.

(b) The primary tasks of the fighters would be the defence of the Singapore Base and the protection of convoys bringing land and air reinforcements to Malaya. The reason for this was that we could not hope to regain superiority without powerful reinforcements. The safe arrival of such reinforcements was therefore the first essential in our air strategy.

As a result of this policy it was clear that the Army would suffer from lack of air support and of close co-operation in the fighting on the mainland, though some seaward reconnaissance would still be possible. I accepted this situation.

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