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5. Defences of Singapore Island
While a review of all the circumstances attending the selection and protection of the Seletar Naval Base would be out of place here, the main facts must be touched on for an understanding of the position when Singapore fell.
At the time it was chosen, the Seletar site possessed almost every possible advantage. The only sea approach was up the narrow, but deep, Johore Strait, and effective bombardment by a hostile fleet would be impossible in the face of heavy coast batteries. Equally, landing from seawards would be extremely hazardous, if not impossible, under fire of coast guns and on defended beaches.
The influence of developments in the air could at that time be seen only in a general way, but there was certainly no reason to expect our inferiority in the air to an enemy in Malaya. An attack from the north might be made by an enemy enjoying command of the sea by landing, say. at Mersing. on the East Coast though operations of this type were becoming more and more risky unless the army attempting them had also complete air superiority. There remained the possibility of an advance down the length of the peninsula, by an army based on Indo-China or Thailand or from landing in the: North-east.
In this connection the collapse of France and all it has since entailed in every theatre of war would scarcely be treated as a likely factor in appreciations of ten years ago. Such was the background.
On the outbreak of war in 1939 many aerodromes had been planned or were being built on the peninsula. Air was to play the main part in defence. Possible landing beaches were being wired and pill-boxes erected. France had not been attacked.
Engineers were still putting the final touches to the Naval Base in Singapore and this work was actually continued until the evacuation.
In this event the army and air force in Malaya would have failed in their main role.
The primary role of the army and air force in Malaya was to ensure the uninterrupted functioning of the naval base. The quickest and cheapest way for an enemy to put the base out of action - if only temporarily - would be by heavy and frequent raids by fighter-escorted bombers. Seizure of aerodrome south of Canteen / Kuala Lumpur would bring an enemy air force within fighter range of the Naval Base.
Looked at in this way the provision of elaborate all round Singapore Island could only be regarded as insurance against an unlikely and hazardous enterprise. The insurance might certainly have been taken out after Japanīs assumption of virtual control of Indo-China and Thailand, but for two difficulties, and one false assumption:-
The first difficulty lay in the nature of the ground on the West and North-west shores, where there were creeks with mud banks, and a heavy growth of mangrove. Booms would have been required at the mouths of the creeks; strong points organised on craft either anchored or sunk or, alternatively, in pill boxes built among the mud banks and swamps. It could have been done if commenced in time.
The second difficulty was over labour. For the amount of work to be done, in keeping pace with the situation and a growing garrison there was insufficient labour for military purposes on Singapore Island. After the middle of 1940 there was certainly insufficient labour available to Malaya Command for the construction of a thorough system of defences round the whole Island perimeter. There was, in fact, a grave shortage for meeting urgent day-to-day requirements.
The false assumption made refers to the effectiveness of the mangrove swamps themselves as obstacles. Though not easily penetrated, they could not be treated as impassable to an enterprising enemy who had studied the problem and had proved his skill in landing operations. There were, of course, other stretches of shore where little had been done in the way of defence, for instance, eastwards between the Naval Base and Sungei Seletar and thence towards Changi, but the ground was easier in these areas and even in the short period available after withdrawal to the Island it was found possible to accomplish more than on the West and North-west.
The question of the mangrove-covered shore between Sungei Jurong and Kranji has been dealt with more fully because of its influence on the course of events.
To sum up, in the earlier period of the development of the Naval Base, complete perimeter defence of the Island was not regarded as urgent or at any rate sufficiently important to hinder completion of the main works. When war in the west commenced all available labour was required for speeding up half-finished projects and meeting new developments; on the outbreak of war with Japan there was neither time nor labour. In the last phase, with all troops withdrawn to the Island, there was no time.
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