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7. Conclusion
The results of being forced, unprepared, into a world war have a way of making themselves felt expectationally, in awkward quarters and at awkward junctures. The greater the disparity between responsibilities and means, the greater the risk of disaster. Malaya is a tragic example of the truth of these platitudes.
It was as though someone had dropped a time bomb which had lain for so long in the ground that it was being commonly counted a blind, but, even if it were not a dud, counter-measures could be so easily devised that it would be as well if the thing did go off and remove the threat once and for all. The bomb was Japanese preparation for mastery of East Asia and the shock which started the mechanism was the outbreak of war in the West in 1939, while the second jolt which accelerated the wheels was the collapse of France. The danger was now much more real, but with America certain to come to our help. Japanese action could in the end be nothing short of suicide. And so it will be, but in the meantime she has made gains beyond her wildest hopes and has not yet come to the end of her successes. There was Pearl Harbour, then the sinking of our ships, then, most surprising of all, her nine-week drive from Thailand to Singapore. That seems to be where our calculations broke down. We must have known she was capable of and even likely to take suicidal risks but at the worst we counted on holding her long enough on the peninsula to allow of the tables being turned.
We had to accept the risk of her attacking in .superior force, but we did not realise the extent of her preparations or the margin of superiority she was to enjoy in every direction. We cut it too fine.
She had to reach Singapore in 9 weeks or not at all.
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