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Part 2
Section XXIV: — West Coast Operations, I8th-3Oth December, 1941.
208. The Grik Road: —On the 19th December our troops, who had now been reinforced, moved forward to recapture Sumpitan, led by the Independent Company. An encounter battle took place in the village, where our troops fought gallantly and were only with drawn in face of a strong counter-attack. That night they fell back to Lenggong. On the 20th the Argylls were heavily engaged all day and had to drive off by counter-attack an enemy force which had moved down the river on rafts and reached Kota Tampan in their rear. On the 21st the Argylls held the Kota Tampan area against renewed enemy attacks, while the 5/2 Punjab Regt. occupied positions west of Chenderoh Lake. Some enemy rafts were sunk on the lake. At about 1800 hrs. the Argylls disengaged and withdrew through the 5/2 Punjab Regt. and the enemy following up were stopped at the Causeway.
The river approach through the Chenderoh Lake now gave the Japanese the opportunity of by-passing Kuala Kangsar and of threatening the main road and railway bridges over the River Perak and the communications east of them. To meet this threat the 4/19 Hyderabad Regt., which had now arrived from Kelantan, was concentrated east of the River Perak.
The enemy were now only some 12 miles from Lawin, where the Grik road joins the trunk road, and the situation demanded the speedy withdrawal of the 28 Brigade Group before it could be cut off in its positions north of Taiping.
209. The Krian River Front: — On the 19th and 20th December there was some activity on the right of the Krian River position and, to avoid being outflanked on the right, the 28 Brigade Group fell back to Ulu Sapetang and Bagan Serai. The bridges over the River Krian were demolished.
210. The Tactical Situation: — On the evening of 21st December all troops west of the River Perak, including those on the Grik road, were placed directly under the Commander 11 Indian Division. He decided that, in view of the situation on the Grik road, an immediate withdrawal behind the River Perak was necessary. He realised the importance of covering the Blanja Pontoon Bridge over the River Perak which gave direct access to the Ipoh area and the communications south of it.
The withdrawal of the 28 Brigade Group commenced at 2000 hrs. 21st December, the units being disposed as far as possible to meet all possible threats.
On the 22nd December there was further fighting on the Grik Road and that night the 12 Brigade Group withdrew across the Perak River covered by troops of the 28 Brigade Group. By the morning of the 23rd December all troops, except for a bridgehead at Blanja, were east of the river. The Blanja bridgehead was withdrawn on the night 23rd-24th December.
A gap was successfully blown in the Iskander Bridge, the fine main road bridge over the River Perak. A portion of the pontoon bridge at Blanja was swung to the eastern shore and the pontoons sunk.
On withdrawal the 12 Brigade Group bivouacked in the Salak North area and the 28 Brigade Group concentrated in the Siputeh area with a detachment watching the River Perak at Blanja.
2l1. Summary: — After sixteen days of continuous and exhausting operations our troops on the west coast were back behind the River Perak. What would have happened had Operation MATADOR been put into effect in good time is a matter for speculation. It is almost certain that it would have eased the air situation by denying to the enemy some of its fighter bases. On the other hand, had we been un able to hold the strong enemy thrust on the Kroh front our communications to North Malaya and subsequently to East Malaya would have been severed and our whole structure of defence undermined. For the frustration of the enemy's plan to destroy our forces in this way we are indebted particularly to the fine fighting of the troops on the Kroh and Grik roads and to the quick reaction of all commanders to the very real threat which the enemy's thrust on this front constituted.
212. Operations in the Ipoh area: — On the 22nd December the Commander 3 Indian Corps decided to hold the areas south of Ipoh as under: —
One Brigade Group between Kg. Sahum and Tapah.
One Brigade Group covering road and rail way north of Kampar.
One Brigade Group covering road and rail way north of Bidor with a battalion at Ct. Jong and the Independent Company at Telok Anson.
On the 23rd December the Commander 3 Indian Corps issued instructions to the Commander 11 Indian Division, the gist of which were as under: —
(a) The Commander 11 Indian Division would assume control of all combatant troops north of the Rivers Slim and Bernam.
(b) The enemy was to be delayed for as long as possible west of the River Kinta.
(c) The positions at Kg. Sahum—Kampar Tapah and Bidor must be held until the strategic situation demanded that the Division be withdrawn. A rear position was being prepared in the neighbourhood of the River Slim.
(d) Local offensive operations were advocated.
(e) In case communications should be cut, each battalion was to hold to days' supplies and ammunition.
(f) Fighting patrols were to be employed to watch the flanks which could never be secure.
(g) Civil labour was being engaged and handled by the Europeans of the Perak Volunteer Force.
The 6/15 Indian Infantry Brigade had now been rested and reorganised. Three days in the Ipoh area had worked wonders. All units had been partly, but far from completely, re-equipped. The outlook was very much brighter. The Kampar position was rapidly put into a state of defence.
213. On the 26th and 27th December the 12 Brigade Group fought a delaying action north of Chemor (10 miles north of Ipoh) inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy, whose units moved forward in close formation. The 5/2 Punjab Regiment, upon which the brunt of the fighting fell, distinguished itself though it suffered fairly heavy losses.
During these two days the 28 Brigade Group continued to watch the line of the River Perak in the Blanja area.
By the 26th all troops remaining in Ipoh had moved south. Among the last to leave their posts were the Chinese and Eurasian girl operators of the telephone exchange who were handling military traffic and who continued to do so in the face of bombing and the approach of the enemy until ordered to leave. They deserve the highest praise.
The withdrawal of the 12 and 28 Brigade Groups began at 1900 hrs. on the 27th December and continued throughout the night. The 12 Brigade Group, to which had been allotted the task of delaying the enemy's approach to the Kampar position north of Dipang, occupied a position south of Gopeng, while the 28 Brigade Group took up positions astride the defile road which protected the right flank of the Kampar position, with one battalion in the Tapah area.
The newly formed Kedah Armoured Car Company, manned by European Volunteers, acquitted itself well during and following the withdrawal. It now became apparent, how ever, that the enemy were using an armour piercing bullet against which the armour of the Marmon-Harrington armoured cars was not proof. Many casualties were suffered by the crews of these cars during the subsequent operations.
214. On the 29th December the 12 Brigade Group was early in contact with the enemy who attacked at 1000hrs.The attack was repulsed but, realising that the enemy was now in strength, the divisional commander ordered the brigade to withdraw that evening through the Kampar position and come into reserve at Bidor. The enemy followed up the withdrawal closely and again tanks produced a de-moralizing effect on the tired troops. The situation was saved by some excellent work on the part of the 137 Field Regt. and the 80 A/Tk. Regt. The large bridge over the River Kampar at Dipang was destroyed after several abortive attempts.
The 12 Brigade Group had had a gruelling time. Since the battle of Gurun it had borne the brunt of the fighting, and in its doggedly fought rearguard actions between Batu Pekaka and Selama, on the Grik road and in the Ipoh area it had gained time for the re-organization of the remainder of the 11 Indian Division and the occupation of the Kampar position and had inflicted delay and heavy casualties on the enemy. It had, however, suffered severely itself.
215. In order to protect the long and vulnerable communications the 1 Independent Company had been sent to the Telok Anson area on the lower reaches of the River Perak. From here distant boat and cycle patrols were sent out. It was supported by one infantry battalion at Ct. Jong.
216. Operations of Rose Force: — Towards the end of December a successful raid was carried out by Rose Force, strength about 40 men, against the enemy's communications west of the River Perak. The party was landed from the sea on the Perak coast but was un fortunately weakened by the breakdown of one of the troop-carrying launches. A M.T. column was ambushed and some lorries and two staff cars containing high-ranking officers destroyed. The party was then withdrawn to Port Swettenham. With a little more persistence even greater results might perhaps have been obtained.
217. It was hoped to repeat and develop this enterprise which undoubtedly offered great possibilities. That it was not found possible to do so was due to the lack of sea transport which resulted in the main from losses suffered as a result of the aerial supremacy which the enemy had established on this coast. The last hope disappeared when on the 1st January five "Eureka'' fast coastal vessels which the Army had purchased from America and handed over to the Navy to operate were attacked by air craft on their way north to Port Swettenham and either sunk or driven ashore. On the 3Oth December also H.M.S. "Kudat", the base depot ship lor this force, was bombed and sunk in the harbour of Port Swettenham.
218. Air Operations: — The 23rd December was the first day of intensive air action against our troops in the forward areas. Up till then the enemy's air effort had been concentrated chiefly against our aerodromes. On that day heavy attacks were made against troops in bivouac areas and on the move and against Ipoh railway station. These attacks continued for the rest of the month. Our own troops were almost entirely without air support as all the remaining lighters except for a few which operated from Kuala Lampur had by now been withdrawn to the Singapore area.
Air attacks against the Singapore area were not renewed until the 29th December when the first of a succession of night attacks took place.
Our own Air Striking Force, which seldom consisted of more than half a dozen machines, carried out night attacks against enemy occupied aerodromes. The Sungei Patani Aerodrome in particular, where over 100 Japanese aircraft had been located, was attacked on several occasions. In addition, aerial reconnaissances were carried out daily off both the east and west coasts as far as the availability of aircraft permitted.
The C.-in-C. Far East laid down as a policy that convoy protection work must in the future take precedence over all other calls on the Air Force.
219. Strategy: — In a telephone conversation which I had with the Commander 3 Indian Corps at 1100 hrs. 29th December it was agreed that it would be better to fight the enemy in the positions then occupied rather than carry out any rearward movements in the immediate future, although this in no way altered the general instructions.
On the same day I informed the Commanders 3 Indian Corps and A.I.F. that I had arranged with the Director of Public Works to form Works Groups in selected areas under State engineers who would report to them for orders. The object of this was to prepare a series of obstacles, especially anti-tank obstacles, in great depth on the probable line of the enemy's advance. The idea was that the officers of the Public Works Department should be given out line instructions and be left to carry out the work themselves with civil labour.
On the 28th December the Commander Singapore Fortress was ordered to prepare schemes for the destruction of the Causeway which connected Singapore Island with the mainland.
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