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Part 4
THE TRANSPORTATION PROBLEM.
10. Apart from the small number of troops available, the defence of N.E. India was complicated by the poverty of the communications from the rest of India into Assam and Eastern Bengal. Assam is cut off from the rest of India by the great Brahmaputra river which is unbridged throughout its length. Its level fluctuates during the year by as much as 25 feet and its course sometimes by several miles. The railway system east of the Brahmaputra was a single track metre gauge with no modern train control system and very limited resources in locomotives and rolling stock. The system was served by wagon ferries at two places over the Brahmaputra capable of dealing only with a very limited number of wagons per day. There is no all-weather road from India to the west bank of the Brahmaputra, while the only west to east road in Assam was the second class single width road which ran from Gauhati ferry to the North-East; so that the deficiencies of the railway could not be replaced by road transport; indeed, all vehicles had to be transported to Assam by rail. Nor could river transport solve the problem. Many steamers had been sent earlier in the war to the rivers of Iraq, and the river system merely led to the railway system on the east bank, which was the limiting transportation factor.
On the Bengal front, communications were not better. The delta of the Ganges is unbridged; and the railway, which terminated a short distance beyond Chittagong, is single line, metre-gauge. Some small use could, however, be made of sea transport.
11. I have already in. my Burma despatch of the 14th July, 1942, given some account of the endeavours to construct a road from Assam to Burma. At the same time (about February, 1942) the construction of an adequate railhead and advanced base at Manipur Road station on the Bengal and Assam railway was undertaken. At the time this was a wayside halt in the heart of dense jungle at the spot where the road to Imphal takes off. It was unfortunately intensely malarial. Here a railhead had to be laid out in a short time, to handle 1,000 tons of stores a day, eventually rising to 2,000 tons, while depot areas had to be made to hold a reserve of 30 days for a force of three divisions, together with a generous complement of non divisional troops and labour.
Much other work had .to be done to improve the communications in Assam. A new railhead and advanced base was made at Ledo; an additional river port was made at Doinaigon on the Brahmaputra north of Jorhat, and the railway was extended to meet it; many additional crossing places were made on the railway and the control system improved; the ferry capacity over the Brahmaputra at Gauhati ferry was greatly increased; and other improvements to the railway, road and telegraph system carried out.
12. The transportation problem would have been an extremely difficult one in any event. It was further complicated in 1942 by the following events. There was an exceptionally heavy monsoon which caused extensive flooding and interruption of railway communications north of the Brahmaputra and elsewhere; and also resulted in continual landslides on the road to Imphal, which was the sole line of communications to a large part of the force. This was followed toy the worst malaria epidemic which India had known for many years; there was a particularly high incidence amongst lorry drivers and transportation personnel, which had' a cumulative effect in worsening the situation. Finally, from August onward, the rebellion organised by Congress after the breakdown of the Gripps negotiations in April was directed especially against our communications to N.E. India.
The Japanese raid into the Bay of Bengal (see paragraph 5) in April caused for some time the practical closing of the Bay of Bengal and the eastern ports to shipping and threw extra strain on the railways. The port of Chittagong was closed altogether and much of the port equipment was removed in May, when a Japanese attack on Chittagong seemed probable.
13. The transportation and other difficulties enumerated above naturally had a considerable effect on the efficiency of the troops. Those in Manipur, who were dependent on the Imphal road for supply, had to subsist on less than full rations for a considerable portion of the summer, and the resultant malnutrition increased their susceptibility to malaria and other disease. It was impossible also, owing to the breaking of the road, to provide satisfactory medical accommodation and' equipment or to evacuate the sick to better conditions.
This again increased the sick rate. Many of the troops had been through the exhausting Burma campaign and should have been relieved and rested had the reliefs or transport facilities been available. In October, November and December, when conditions began to improve, some 20,000 sick had to be evacuated from Eastern Army area. This was in addition to some 15,000 who had been evacuated before the rains, when the army returned from Burma.
The disturbances caused by Congress in August threw a fresh strain on the army, which had to be used for internal security instead of its legitimate work of training and equipping for the dry weather season. The equivalent of 58 battalions had to be employed; of these 24 belonged to the Field Army and the equivalent of 7 were formed' from Reinforcement Camps and Training Centres; the remainder were battalions already allotted to internal security duties. The employment of units from Reinforcement Camps and Training Centres resulted in delay to the flow of reinforcements to formations on the Eastern Frontier which were already seriously below strength owing to the high incidence of malaria.
I should like to pay a tribute to the admirable spirit and' discipline shown by the troops engaged on the unpleasant task of restoring order during these troubles. The civil services, armed and unarmed, worked in close co-operation with the military forces in dealing with disorders. The work of the police, who were often isolated, was generally admirable, and their steadfastness greatly lightened the burden thrown on the troops.
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